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RECENT CASES
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION - DISQUALIFICATION - STATUS OF HEIR WHO
PROCURES DEATH OF INTESTATE. - Defendant after murdering his mother died
from self-inflicted wounds. According to the statutes of descent and distri-
bution in the state of Maine, he was his mother's sole heir and thus would
normally have taken her estate, as there was no statute prohibiting a mur-
derer of an ancestor from inheriting from the ancestor's estate. The plain-
tiffs, who would have inherited the estate if the defendant were disqualified,
brought a bill in equity in which they sought to have the executor of the
defendant's estate be declared a constructive trustee of property that the
defendant's estate had acquired by the murder of his mother. In determin-
ing whether a person who murders his ancestor may inherit from the ancestor
and thus profit from his own wrongful act the court held that the murderer
could inherit the estate but equity would impose upon him, or the repre-
sentatives of his estate, a constructive trust for the benefit of the person or per-
sons who would have taken if the murderer had predeceased the victim.
Dutill v. Dana, 113 A.2d 499 (Me. 1955).
The co-urts in considering the problem presented by the instant case lack
unanimity. Under what is apparently the majority view, a murderer can in-
herit from his victim.' Some courts ascribing to this holding base their
determinations upon the theory that the law prescribes sufficient penalties
for the commission of crimes and that the courts should not add thereto.
As was stated in Wall v. Pfanschmidt:2 "Public policy does not demand th-is
forfeiture, for the demands of public policy are satisfied by the proper execu-
tion of laws and punishment of crime. If other punishment be required, the
duty to so provide rests upon the legislative branch of the government.
Whether this accords with natural right and justice is not for the courts to
decide."3
Other tribunals reaching the same result have concluded that as the
statutes do not clearly prohibit the murderer from inheriting, to read such an
exception into the statute would constitute judicial legislation.
4
A second line of decisions, in accord with the civil law,5 holds that as no
person should be permitted to profit from his own wrong, a murderer cannot
be allowed to inherit from his victim even though there is no specific statute
forbidding such an inheritance. 6 This theory has been accepted in a number
of jurisdictions and is gaining favor in others. 7 The result thus obtained is
commendable, although the judicial legislation necessary to its achievement
must be considered otherwise.
It is suggested that a third group of courts, which have held in accordance
with the instant case, have effectuated the most desirable solution. While the
result is identical with that reached by those courts following the civil law
rule, the objectionable criticism of. judicial legislation has been eliminated.
1. Hagen v. Cone, 21 Ga.App. 416, 94 S.E. 602 (1917); Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265
Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); Wilson v. Randolph, 50 Nev. 371, 261 Pac. 654 (1927);
Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W.Va. 70, 100 S.E. 865 (1919); In --e
Duncan's Estate, 40 Wash.2d 850, 246 P.2d 445 (1952).
2. 26 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914).
3. Ibid. at 790.
4. In re Duncan's Estate, 40 Wash.2d 850, 246 P.2d 445 (1952).
5. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889); Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill.
180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914).
6. Garwols v. Banker's Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W. 239 (1930): De Zoten
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 60 S.D. 232, 245 N.W. 58 (1932).
7. De Zotell . Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 60 S.D. 232, 245 N.W. 58 (1932),
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This theory, which has been adopted by the Restatement of the Law of
Restitution 8 and warmly applauded by some scholars, 9 has, unfortunately,
been applied by but few jurisdictions.'0
North Dakota has a statute which prohibits any person convicted of
feloniously causing the death of another from receiving any property by
succession, will, or otherwise by reason of the death of that person."' The
property would pass as though the wrongdoer had predeceased the victim.'
2
It is at once apparent that the statute is inadequate in at least two re-
spects. First, the requirement of conviction renders the statute inapplicable
in the event of the self-destruction of the perpetrator of the crime. 13 Second,
the use of the term "feloniously" would require application of the statute
not only when murder, but also when first and second degree manslaughter
are involved. 14 This would seem to be a harsh result when compared with
decisions in other states.' 1 These inadequacies could easily be remedied by
minor legislative changes.
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REAL. PROPERTY - PERPETUITIES - SUSPENSION OF ABSOLUTE POWER OF
ALIENATION THROUCH BUSINESS TRUSTS - By the terms of a trust set up
to pool oil and gas interests, a one-half interest in the oil and gas in one
quarter section of land was transferred by each of forty parties to the trustee
for the benefit of the trust. The defendant trustee, in return, transferred to
each of the forty parties twenty shares of beneficial interest which entitled
the holders to a share of revenue obtained by the trust, and retained, as
compensation for managing the trust income, two hundred such shares. The
trust was to last for ten years unless oil and gas was struck in which case
it was to last so long as oil or gas was produced. The North Dakota court held
that the trust was void because it suspended the absolute power of alienation
for a period longer than that permitted by statute. Carlson v. Tioga Holding Co.,
72 N.W.2nd 236 (N.D. 1955).
The statute in effect at the time of the execution of the instrument provided
that the absolute power of alienation could not be suspended for a longer period
than, "(1) During the continuance of the lives of persons in being at the
creation of the limitation. or conditions; or (2) For a period not to exceed
twenty-five years from the time of creation of the suspension."' By statute,
the absolute power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in
8. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §187 (2) (1936).
9. 1 Page, WILLS §232 (3d ed. 1941); 3 Scott, TRUSTS §492 (st ed. 1939).
10. In re Duncan's Estate, 40 Wash.2d 850, 246 P.2d 445 (1952).
11. N.D. Rev. Code, §56-0423 (1943): "No person ... feloniously causing the death
of another shall . . . receive any property or benefit by succession, will or otherwise . . .
by reason of the death of such person . .. , but all property shall vest . . . as if 'he
person convicted were dead when the testator died."
12. Ibid.
13. See Harrison v. Hillegas, 1 Ohio Supp. 160 (1939); Winters National Bank and
Trust Co. v. Shields, 3 Ohio Supp. 134 (1939).
14. N.D. Rev. Code, §12-0107, 12-2718, 12-2720 (1943).
15. Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 808 (D. Ore. 1952).
1. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0227 (1943). Now amended to read ". .. the absolute
power of alienation cannot be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a
longer period than during the continuance of the lives of persons in being at the creation
of the limitation or condition and twenty-one years." N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0227 (1953
Supp.).
